A fundamental philosophical question is whether the mind can be mechanised. Attempts to answer it so far have been inconclusive; I argue that with the tools of mathematical logic this question can be sharpened and addressed in a f...
ver más
¿Tienes un proyecto y buscas un partner? Gracias a nuestro motor inteligente podemos recomendarte los mejores socios y ponerte en contacto con ellos. Te lo explicamos en este video
Proyectos interesantes
GODELIANA
The Gödel Enigma Unveiling a Hidden Logical Heritage
2M€
Cerrado
MeReMath
Mechanised Reverse Mathematics in the Calculus of Inductive...
196K€
Cerrado
ExtenDD
Coming to Terms: Proof Theory Extended to Definite Descripti...
2M€
Cerrado
NTNSP
A Non Contractive Theory of Naive Semantic Properties Logic...
169K€
Cerrado
FFI2008-05859
LOGICAS CONSTRUCTIVAS BASICAS PARA CUATRO CONCEPTOS DE CONSI...
23K€
Cerrado
GENERALISE
Generalisation into sentence and predicate positions
1M€
Cerrado
Información proyecto SLMK
Duración del proyecto: 31 meses
Fecha Inicio: 2016-02-15
Fecha Fin: 2018-09-30
Fecha límite de participación
Sin fecha límite de participación.
Descripción del proyecto
A fundamental philosophical question is whether the mind can be mechanised. Attempts to answer it so far have been inconclusive; I argue that with the tools of mathematical logic this question can be sharpened and addressed in a framework where genuine progress can be achieved.
I will consider a disjunctive thesis proposed by Gödel (known as Gödel's Disjunction) as a precise version of this question. Once sharpened, the question becomes whether a Turing machine (an idealised computer) can output exactly the statements that are 'absolutely provable'—i.e. the mathematical statements that can be proved in principle by an idealised mathematician not bound by limitations of time and cognitive resources. Gödel's Disjunction states that either the powers of the human mind exceed those of a Turing machine, or there are true but unprovable mathematical statements—i.e. mathematical statements that are beyond the reach of human reason. My proposed research will provide a novel account of 'absolute provability' or 'provability in principle' by developing a formal framework that overcomes the philosophical and technical shortcomings of the previous approaches. Having formulated the correct framework for absolute provability and uncovered its underlying mechanisms, I will be able to determine the status of Gödel’s disjunction. This will shed considerable light on the question of whether mind can be mechanised, a question central to philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, and on the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge.