In many real-life object allocation problems, objects' priorities involve indifference classes. The common practice to deal with ties is to randomly break them to obtain strict priorities. From the ex-ante point of view, random ti...
ver más
¿Tienes un proyecto y buscas un partner? Gracias a nuestro motor inteligente podemos recomendarte los mejores socios y ponerte en contacto con ellos. Te lo explicamos en este video
Información proyecto NSMP
Líder del proyecto
SABANCI UNIVERSITESI
No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.
TRL
4-5
Presupuesto del proyecto
100K€
Fecha límite de participación
Sin fecha límite de participación.
Descripción del proyecto
In many real-life object allocation problems, objects' priorities involve indifference classes. The common practice to deal with ties is to randomly break them to obtain strict priorities. From the ex-ante point of view, random tie breaking induces random priorities. In this setting, Dr. Afacan will introduce a fairness notion generalizing the usual stability of Gale and Shapley (1962) to the random priorities setting. Then, he will check whether the well-adopted agent-optimal stable mechanism satisfies that notion along with other desirable properties. Dr. Afacan will next contruct a mechanism mainly built on the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). He will define that new rule in a way that it will dominate the agent-optimal stable mechanism on the efficiency and fairness grounds. Lastly, he will characterize the introduced new mechanism.