Hola,
¿eres nuevo aquí?

Regístrate gratis y conecta tu empresa con financiación pública, partners y proyectos.

Tengo cuenta

Regístrate

Ver video

WIDE

Financiado

Cerrado

Welfare Incentives Dynamics and Equilibrium

Informational frictions lead to inefficient allocations, reducing welfare. Dynamic incentive theory offers a powerful conceptual framework to analyse the optimal design of contracts and mechanisms mitigating these inefficiencies.... ver más

31/05/2026

ETABLISSEMENT DENS...

1M€

Presupuesto del proyecto: 1M€

Líder del proyecto

ETABLISSEMENT DENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR CONSULA... No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.

TRL 4-5

Fecha límite participación Sin fecha límite de participación.

Ver 2 Participantes

Financiación concedida El organismo H2020 notifico la concesión del proyecto el día 2020-05-12

ERC-2019-ADG: ERC Advanced Grant

I+D

Cerrada hace 5 años

0% 100% 100%

Información adicional privada

No hay información privada compartida para este proyecto. Habla con el coordinador.

2 Participantes

ETABLISSEMENT DENSEIGNEMENT...

1.24M€ | Lider

FERBA AUTOMATISMOS

Proyectos interesantes

grow

Data Science

Software

1M€ Cerrado

ECO2014-59225-P

Data Science

Software

67K€ Cerrado

OIO

Data Science

Software

1M€ Cerrado

PID2021-128990NB-I00

Data Science

Software

23K€ Cerrado

ECO2011-30323-C03-03

Data Science

Software

50K€ Cerrado

ECO2008-00801

Data Science

Applied Physics

133K€ Cerrado

Conecta tu I+D

¿Tienes un proyecto y buscas un partner? Gracias a nuestro motor inteligente podemos recomendarte los mejores socios y ponerte en contacto con ellos. Te lo explicamos en este video

Duración del proyecto: 72 meses Fecha Inicio: 2020-05-12
Fecha Fin: 2026-05-31

Líder del proyecto

ETABLISSEMENT DENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR CONSULA... No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.

TRL 4-5

Presupuesto del proyecto 1M€

Fecha límite de participación Sin fecha límite de participación.

Descripción del proyecto Informational frictions lead to inefficient allocations, reducing welfare. Dynamic incentive theory offers a powerful conceptual framework to analyse the optimal design of contracts and mechanisms mitigating these inefficiencies. Its technical difficulty and abstractness, however, have limited its applications. The objective of this project is to develop new frameworks to enhance the applicability of dynamic incentive theory and address important unanswered applied questions: 1) In corporate finance, I will evaluate the quantitative relevance of dynamic contract theory. To do so, I will develop a new structural econometric framework and estimate the magnitude of dynamic incentive problems and their consequences for corporate investment and bankruptcy risk. 2) In organization theory, I will study if equilibrium choices lead to excessive complexity. I will model the link between complexity and incentives. Then, in contrast with standard dynamic contract theory, which takes the tasks of agents as given, I will endogenize agents’ tasks and their complexity. Finally I will confront this theory to new data on complexity. 3) In asset pricing, I will build a novel equilibrium framework to study the consequences of dynamic incentive constraints for relative prices and the cross section of expected returns. In addition to this positive analysis, I will delineate the normative implications of the theory for financial markets regulation. 4) In public finance, I will study whether financial transactions should be taxed. To do so, I will extend the dynamic mechanism design paradigm of new public finance to financial transaction taxes and compare the distortions induced by these taxes with those induced by taxes on capital or labour income. By delivering useful results on four important issues, this project will demonstrate the applicability of dynamic incentive theory. To do so it will develop novel tools by combining dynamic incentive theory with other methodologies.

Conecta tu I+D

Entra hoy

¿Olvidé mi contraseña?

Financiación

Empresas

CTIs/Universidades

Proyectos

Investigadores