Hola,
¿eres nuevo aquí?

Regístrate gratis y conecta tu empresa con financiación pública, partners y proyectos.

Tengo cuenta

Regístrate

Ver video

SEAL

Financiado

Strategic reasoning for socially good mechanisms

"The design and evaluation of mechanisms for aggregating preferences is a central problem in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In such setting, we need to be able to aggregate individual preferences, which are conflicting when agents are... ver más

31/07/2025

UNINA

173K€

Presupuesto del proyecto: 173K€

Líder del proyecto

UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI FEDERICO II No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.

TRL 4-5

Financiación concedida El organismo HORIZON EUROPE notifico la concesión del proyecto el día 2023-07-10

HORIZON-MSCA-2022-PF-01-01: MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships 2022 ExpectedOutcome:

I+D

Cerrada hace 2 años

0% 100% 100%

Información adicional privada

No hay información privada compartida para este proyecto. Habla con el coordinador.

1 Participantes

UNINA

172.75K€ | Lider

Conecta tu I+D

¿Tienes un proyecto y buscas un partner? Gracias a nuestro motor inteligente podemos recomendarte los mejores socios y ponerte en contacto con ellos. Te lo explicamos en este video

Proyectos interesantes

FIDELITY Fairness and Explanations in Group Recommender Systems. Towa... 181K€ Cerrado

TIN2013-45039-P MARCO PARA SIMULACION SOCIAL MIXED-LEVEL CON AGENTES SOCIO-C... 62K€ Cerrado

TIN2015-67661-P NUEVAS METODOLOGIAS DE SOFT COMPUTING PARA PROBLEMAS DE ALTA... 116K€ Cerrado

TIN2009-14562-C05-05 FUNDAMENTOS Y EXTENSIONES DE LA TECNOLOGIA ANSWER SET PROGRA... 54K€ Cerrado

PRO-DEMOCRATIC Proportional Algorithms for Democratic Decisions 1M€ Cerrado

JCI-2009-05932 Herramientas basadas en agentes para el modelado y simulació... 101K€ Cerrado

Duración del proyecto: 24 meses Fecha Inicio: 2023-07-10
Fecha Fin: 2025-07-31

Líder del proyecto

UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI FEDERICO II No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.

TRL 4-5

Presupuesto del proyecto 173K€

Descripción del proyecto "The design and evaluation of mechanisms for aggregating preferences is a central problem in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In such setting, we need to be able to aggregate individual preferences, which are conflicting when agents are self-interested. More importantly, the mechanism should choose a socially desirable (or ""good"") outcome and reach an equilibrium despite the fact that agents can lie about their preferences. The real-world applications of designing and verifying mechanisms for social choice are manifold, including fair division protocols, secure voting, and truth-tracking via approval voting. Although logic-based languages have been widely used for verification and synthesis of MAS, the use of formal methods for reasoning about auctions under strategic behavior as well as automated mechanism design has not been much explored yet. An advantage in adopting such perspective lies in the high expressivity and generality of logics for strategic reasoning. Moreover, by relying on precise semantics, formal methods provide tools for rigorously analyzing the correctness of systems, which is important to improve trust in mechanisms generated by machines. This project aims to design a logical framework based on Strategy Logic (SL) for formally verifying and designing mechanisms for social choice. More specifically, we aim at (i) proposing an approach addressing the probabilistic setting (with Bayesian information, stochastic transitions and mixed strategies); (ii) identifying fragments of SL that enjoy both good complexity and satisfying expressive power for being applied to classes of mechanisms; (iii) modeling and reasoning about relevant problems from the state-of-the-art in computational social choice using the proposed logical framework; and (iv) methodically studying the obtained fragments in relation to the expressivity, model-checking and satisfiability problems."

Conecta tu I+D

Entra hoy

¿Olvidé mi contraseña?

Financiación

Empresas

CTIs/Universidades

Proyectos

Investigadores