Innovating Works

Simplicity

Financiado
Simplicity and Market Design
Why are actual contracts and market mechanisms often simpler than our theoretical predictions? This is a central puzzle in microeconomics and, in many environments, it constrains our ability to rely on economic models. It raises f... Why are actual contracts and market mechanisms often simpler than our theoretical predictions? This is a central puzzle in microeconomics and, in many environments, it constrains our ability to rely on economic models. It raises further fundamental questions: What does it mean that a contract or a mechanism is simple? How to compare the simplicity of various contracts, mechanisms, and games? The proposed research program aims to address these questions and provide a new behaviorally- grounded foundation for market design, contract theory, and the analysis of simplicity. The program has three complementary parts: (i) to address the simplicity puzzle by developing a novel approach to contracting and mechanism design that takes into account perception errors; (ii) to operationalize what simplicity means and how various mechanisms, contracts, and games can be compared in terms of their simplicity; and (iii) to explore the trade-offs between simplicity and welfare-and-revenue criteria and to develop new practical market mechanisms for markets such as school choice, the assignment of medical transplants, and the auctions of commodities and government securities. ver más
30/06/2027
UZH
2M€
Duración del proyecto: 60 meses Fecha Inicio: 2022-06-14
Fecha Fin: 2027-06-30

Línea de financiación: concedida

El organismo H2020 notifico la concesión del proyecto el día 2022-06-14
Línea de financiación objetivo El proyecto se financió a través de la siguiente ayuda:
ERC-2019-COG: ERC Consolidator Grant
Cerrada hace 5 años
Presupuesto El presupuesto total del proyecto asciende a 2M€
Líder del proyecto
UNIVERSITAT ZURICH No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.
Perfil tecnológico TRL 4-5