THE PROJECTS IN THIS RESEARCH PROPOSAL PERTAIN TO TWO RELATED AREAS OF ECONOMICS: INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS PROJECT GATHERS RESEARCH EFFORT FROM VARIOUS RESEARCH LINES. THE FIRST LINE OF RESEARCH FO...
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01/01/2011
UPNA
109K€
Presupuesto del proyecto: 109K€
Líder del proyecto
UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA
No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.
Total investigadores847
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Sin fecha límite de participación.
Financiación
concedida
El organismo AGENCIA ESTATAL DE INVESTIGACIÓN notifico la concesión del proyecto
el día 2011-01-01
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Información proyecto ECO2011-29533
Líder del proyecto
UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA
No se ha especificado una descripción o un objeto social para esta compañía.
Total investigadores847
Presupuesto del proyecto
109K€
Fecha límite de participación
Sin fecha límite de participación.
Descripción del proyecto
THE PROJECTS IN THIS RESEARCH PROPOSAL PERTAIN TO TWO RELATED AREAS OF ECONOMICS: INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE.THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS PROJECT GATHERS RESEARCH EFFORT FROM VARIOUS RESEARCH LINES. THE FIRST LINE OF RESEARCH FOCUSES ON SEARCH COSTS, AIMING AT PROVIDING NEW INSIGHTS INTO THEIR ROLE IN HORIZONTAL MERGERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EQUILIBRIUM PRICES IN MARKETS WHERE PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS ARE HARD TO FIND BUT PRICES ARE EASILY OBSERVABLE. PART OF THE EFFORT WILL ALSO GO INTO DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE THE DESIGN OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY AND GAS MARKETS. ONE PROJECT HERE WILL PUT SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF FORWARD CONTRACTS AND ON THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY FOR OVERALL MARKET EFFICIENCY. A SECOND PROJECT WILL SURVEY THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION POLICY ON ENERGY MARKETS IN EUROPE AND IN SPAIN. ANOTHER PROJECT AIMS TO BUILD AND SOLVE A MODEL OF COMPETITION IN SCHEDULES WITH AN INFORMATION STRUCTURE THAT ALLOWS FOR PRIVATE AND COMMON VALUE WITH NO NEED OF EXOGENOUS NOISE. A THIRD GROUP OF PROJECTS FOCUSES ON TELECOM MARKETS. WE WILL STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WAY CONSUMERS FORM EXPECTATIONS AND THE IMPACT THAT TERMINATION CHARGES HAVE ON COMPETITION AND WELFARE. THE DYNAMICS OF COMPETITION AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS WILL ALSO BE EXAMINED. A FOURTH STREAM OF RESEARCH WILL EXAMINE THE ROLE OF ENDOGENOUS PUBLIC INFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON WELFARE IN A CONTEXT WHERE PUBLIC INFORMATION IS ENDOGENOUSLY GENERATED AND AGENTS CAN CONDITION ON PUBLIC STATISTICS WHEN MAKING THEIR CHOICES. FINALLY, WE WILL FORMALLY EXAMINE THE CONSUMER WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF SOME TYPE OF POTENTIALLY EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT.THE FINANCE PROJECT ALSO COMPRISES VARIOUS RESEARCH LINES. ONE RESEARCH LINE FOCUSES ON EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF SHORT SELLING CONSTRAINTS ON FINANCIAL MARKETS. A SECOND RESEARCH LINE DEALS WITH INFORMATION AND LEARNING IN MARKETS. ONE SUBPROJECT WILL EXAMINE THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATE INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS IN A COMPETITIVE NOISY, DYNAMIC ASSET PRICING EQUILIBRIUM MODEL. A SECOND SUBPROJECT WILL SHOW THAT IN A GENERAL NOISY RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL, WHERE TRADERS RECEIVE BOTH A SIGNAL ABOUT THE ASSET PAYOFF AND A SHOCK TO THEIR ENDOWMENT (BOTH BEING PRIVATE INFORMATION), A MAIN DRIVER OF THE CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIA IS WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF INVESTORS ARE STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS. ANOTHER SUBPROJECT PROPOSES A THEORY THAT JOINTLY ACCOUNTS FOR AN ASSET ILLIQUIDITY AND FOR THE ASSET PRICE OVER-RELIANCE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION. THE LAST PROJECT OF THIS RESEARCH LINE WILL DETERMINE WHEN WE CAN SAFELY USE COMPETITIVE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA AS AN APPROXIMATION OF THE TRUE STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA IN A STANDARD FINANCIAL MARKET CONTEXT. A THIRD RESEARCH LINE WILL EXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY, FRAGILITY AND REGULATION. THE LAST RESEARCH LINE AIMS TO DEVELOP A MODEL THAT EXPLAINS WHY SOME BANKRUPTCIES ARE PRECEDED BY MASSIVE FRAUD, AND TO STUDY THE REORGANIZATIONS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN 1882 AND 1899 AND THE VOTING TRUST ADDED IN 1893. OSTES DE BUSQUEDA\EXPECTATIVAS RACIONALES\ESTRATEGICO COMPLEMENTARIO\COMERCIO A CORTO Y LARGO PLAZO\VENTAS A CORTO\INFORMACION PUBLICA\PRECIOS DE TERMINACION\COMPETENCIA EN FUNCIONES DE OFERTA\ENERGIA\CONTRATOS DE FUTURO